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ABSTRACT 
The Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012 has had a significant impact 
on bondholders that have sustained onerous losses. Despite having 
resorted to the justice system to find reparation for such losses, to date, 
neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have awarded 
investors the desired compensation. This Article explores the reasons 
that led to the failure of bondholders’ cases against Greece and 
explores whether there is room for a different result for bondholders 
before investment tribunals. This Article evaluates and analyses the 
possible outcome of bondholders’ claims under investment treaty law 
for breach of standards of treatment (including Most Favored Nation, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Expropriation and Umbrella Clauses) 
and investigates potential defenses that could be raised by Greece to 
such claims. Lastly, this Article suggests alternative ways bondholders 
may obtain reparation, including Credit Default Swaps. 
INTRODUCTION 
Greece has been facing financial difficulties for the greater part of 
its latest history.1 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Greek 
economy was not prepared to face the great financial crisis of 2009. 
Spending more than it could afford, it quickly faced growing budgetary 
deficits that led to a sky-rocketing public debt.2 Hence, in 2012, Greece 
shocked the global financial markets by announcing the largest 
sovereign bond haircut in history.3 The term “haircut” refers to the 
restructuring of the terms of sovereign debt instruments, by reducing 
recovery value of such instruments.4 To date, investors have brought 
two cases against Greece for the events of the Greek Haircut of 2012 
 
1 See Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, The Pitfalls of External Dependence: 
Greece, 1829-2015, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 307–28 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ConferenceDraft_ReinhartTre 
besch_GreekDebtCrisis.pdf. 
2 See REBECCA M. NELSON, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41167, GREECE’S DEBT 
CRISIS: OVERVIEW, POLICY RESPONSES, AND IMPLICATIONS (2011). 
3 Miranda Xafa, Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring, VOXEU (June 25, 
2014), http://voxeu.org/article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned. 
4 FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS 
FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 324 (2006). 
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and, in particular, for the forcible introduction of collective action 
clauses (CACs) through the Greek Bondholder Law, No. 4050/2012. 
Both cases are founded on similar facts. 
Claimants, in both cases, were holders of Greek sovereign bonds 
which, at the time of purchase, did not include CACs. Instead, the 
Greek State unilaterally introduced CACs, through Law 4050/2012, 
just a few days before the “haircut” of the bonds’ value.5 As per the 
CACs, a restructuring of the bonds could be approved by a qualified 
majority of more than 66.7% of the bondholders.6 In both cases, the 
claimants did not approve the restructuring of their bonds but were 
nonetheless bound by the restructure due to collective action clauses. 
Indeed, as the participation of bondholders in the bond exchange 
reached 152 billion euros worth of sovereign bonds governed by Greek 
law out of the approximately 177 billion Euros,7 this percentage 
(85.9%) allowed Greece to trigger the CACs and compel all holders of 
sovereign bonds governed by Greek law to consent to the terms of the 
bond exchange.8 As a result, in both cases, the claimants’ bonds were 
exchanged for new bonds of a lesser face value equal to only 31.5% of 
the principal amount of the face amount of the old bonds.9 
However, the two cases were filed and heard by two different 
judicial bodies and on different legal bases. In particular, the first case, 
Mamatas and Others v. Greece, was filed before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) by 6,320 Greek investors claiming that the 
above introduction of CACs and subsequent haircut of their bonds 
constituted a violation of their human rights.10 The second case, 
Poštová Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. the Hellenic Republic, was 
 
5 ARTURO C. PORZECANSKI, BEHIND THE GREEK DEFAULT AND RESTRUCTURING OF 
2012, SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING 33 (Eugenio A. Bruno ed., Globe 
Business Publishing 2013). 
6 Based on a quorum of votes representing at least fifty percent of bond’s face value and 
a consent threshold of two-thirds of the face-value holders taking part in the vote. See 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy (2013) 28 ECON. 
POL’Y 513, 524 (2013). 
7 Press Release, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Fin. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://av.r.ftdata 
.co.uk/files/2012/03/9-MARCH-2012.pdf. 
8 Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 6. 
9 BANK OF GREECE, REPORT ON THE RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
GREEK BANKING SECTOR 12 (Dec. 2012), http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis 
/Report_on_the_recapitalisation_and_restructuring.pdf. 
10 Information Note on the Court’s Case Law, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 198, 21 (July 2016) 
HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2016_07_198_ENG.pdf [hereinafter 
Information Note]. 
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filed before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) on the grounds that the unilateral introduction of 
CACs and subsequent haircut constituted a breach of a standard of 
protection awarded by the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Greece 
and Slovakia, and Greece and Cyprus.11 
Despite appealing to two different judiciary bodies under different 
legal frameworks, in both cases, the judgment issued was in favor of 
Greece, leaving both groups of investors in a worse position than 
before. This raises the question: what is the optimum venue and 
framework for distressed investors to bring sovereign default claims? 
This Article examines the reasons that led to the dismissal of the 
investors’ claims while addressing whether investment tribunals could 
still prove a suitable venue for Greek investors under different 
circumstances. 
I 
THE CASE OF MAMATAS AND OTHERS V. GREECE 
Mamatas and Others v. Greece originated from three applications, 
namely application Nos. 63066/14, 64297/14, and 66106/14, which 
were all addressed against the Hellenic Republic.12 These applications 
were filed by 6,320 Greek nationals between September 17, 2014 and 
October 1, 2014.13 The applications were all founded on the 
aforementioned facts, namely the unilateral introduction of CACs in 
the bonds held by the applicants and their forcible participation in the 
Greek bond exchange whereby their bonds were exchanged for other 
debt instruments of lesser value.14 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected the Greek 
Government’s objection that local remedies had not been exhausted. 
Thus, the ECtHR declared the applicants’ complaint admissible and 
proceeded to examine the merits of the complaint. 
The applicants invoked two rights recognized by the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), namely the right to property 
(Article 1 of Protocol 1 of ECHR) and the right to non-discrimination 
 
11 See Poštová Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/8, Final Award, ¶ 170 (Apr. 9, 2015). 
12 Information Note, supra note 10, at 21. 
13 Mamatas et Autres c. Greće (Mamatas and Others v. Greece), Judgment (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), App. No. 63033/14, 64297/14, 66106/15, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. 256, ¶ 1, 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{itemid”:[“001-164969]}. 
14 Id. ¶ 25. 
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(Article 14 of ECHR).15 As per the applicants, the forcible exchange of 
their bonds by virtue of the Bondholders’ Law, No. 4050/2012, 
amounted to a de facto expropriation of their bonds and, therefore, of 
their property or, alternatively, an interference with their possessions 
in contravention of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR (Article 1).16 
Additionally, the applicants contended that they sustained 
discrimination vis-à-vis other major corporate creditors,17 as despite the 
vast differences between the experience and resources available 
between the two categories of investors, the investors were treated 
alike.18 
The ECtHR concluded that there was no de facto expropriation that 
would, in and of itself, suffice to establish a breach of the right to 
property.19 Instead, the ECtHR proceeded to examine the case under 
the first rule of Article 1.20 The first rule refers to the peaceful 
enjoyment of possession, and given its generic wording, is applied by 
the ECtHR to cases where the other two rules of Article 1—namely the 
second rule relating to deprivation of property and the third rule relating 
to regulation of the use of property—do not apply.21 
As per the first rule, contained in the first sentence of Article 1, an 
interference with a person’s possessions is prohibited when such 
interference cannot be justified via the public or general interest. 
What’s more, such interference also needs to strike a fair balance 
between the interests of the community and those of the affected 
person. Indeed, an interference with possessions, in and of itself, does 
not constitute a violation of Article 1, but the ECtHR will examine 
whether such interference is founded on a law serving the public 
interest.22 If there is a law that serves the public interest, the ECtHR 
 
15 Information Note, supra note 10, at 22. 
16 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 73. 
17 Id. ¶ 125. 
18 Id. ¶ 124. 
19 See Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 1992 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 
(Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
20 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 84–85. 
21 For an extensive analysis of Article of Protocol 1 ECHR, see Laurent Sermet, The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights, Vol. 88, Council of Europe, 
ECHR, 1998. 
22 Christos Rozakis, Former Vice President of the ECHR, Keynote Address on Athens 
Property Day, The Right to Property in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (Jan. 30, 2016), http://uipi.com/new/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Athens-Property  -
Day-2016.-Keynbote-speech.-The-Property-Right-in-the-Case-Law-of-the-ECHR.pdf. 
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will consider whether a fair balance between public interest and the 
right of property is reached. 
The ECtHR applied this analysis in the Mamatas case. After it 
established a prima facie interference with the applicants’ possessions, 
the ECtHR proceeded to examine whether such interference was 
imposed by law.23 The ECtHR then established that the forcible haircut 
was imposed by the Bondholders Law, No. 4050/2012.24 Thereafter, 
the ECtHR considered whether the Bondholders Law was serving the 
public interest.25 Related to this requirement, states also enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation “[b]y reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities 
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide 
both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope 
of derogations necessary to avert it.”26 Especially in cases relating to 
complex economic or social policies, the ECtHR will question the 
legislature’s determination that a measure serves the public interest 
only when such determination is “manifestly without reasonable 
foundation.”27 Hence, the ECtHR easily concluded that the 
Bondholders Law, No. 4050/2012 was, in fact, pursuing a goal in the 
public interest—namely the preservation of economic stability at a time 
when Greece was overwhelmed by a serious economic crisis.28 
Thereafter, the ECtHR proceeded to examine the last, but most 
pivotal criterion to establish whether there was a violation of the right 
to property. The ECtHR examined whether a fair balance was struck 
between the law’s public interest goal and the investors’ right to 
property.29 As per ECtHR case law, for a fair balance to be struck, there 
must exist a proportional relation between the means used and the aim 
sought to be achieved.30 Such proportionality is absent when the 
affected individual sustains an excessive burden.31 To consider the 
extent of such burden, the ECtHR takes into account the duration of the 
 
23 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 94. 
24 Id. ¶ 92. 
25 Id. ¶¶ 101–05. 
26 Brannigan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14553/89; 14554/89 1993 Eur. Ct. H.R., 43; 
see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 1978 Eur. Ct. H.R., 48. 
27 Stec v. United Kingdom, App. No. 65731/01; 65900/01 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R., 52. 
28 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 101–05. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 106–20. 
30 RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 278 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2000). 
31 Id. 
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interference, the severity of the interference, and the terms of the 
compensation.32 However, per ECtHR case law, the threshold for 
establishing that the individual sustained an “excessive burden” is 
difficult to prove.33 In the Mamatas case, the ECtHR noted the extreme 
financial distress that faced Greece at the time while noting that, unless 
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, Greece would be unable 
to pay any debts since it would likely enter into unregulated 
bankruptcy.34 To this end, in evaluating the burden sustained by 
investors, one should consider that the market value of such bonds at 
the time before the exchange was very low, rather than the then current 
nominal value of the bonds. Hence, the ECtHR concluded that the 
losses incurred by the applicants were not excessive, especially 
considering the nature of the bonds as inherently risky transactions, the 
same risks which should have been known by the applicants.35 
Similarly, the ECtHR concluded there was no breach of Article 14 
of the ECHR, which prohibits discrimination, despite the prima facie 
case of discrimination.36 Nonetheless, the equal treatment of all 
investors during the bond exchange was justified by the difficulties in 
locating all of the affected investors: the difficulty involved in setting 
precise criteria for differentiating between bondholders in a very 
volatile market; the possibility of endangering the effectiveness of the 
bond exchange; and the need to swiftly address the difficult financial 
situation in Greece at the time. 
This Article articulates certain shortcomings in the judgment, such 
as interference with the applicant’s property rights and the non-
existence of discrimination. The ECtHR did not fully examine whether 
a fair balance was actually reached by conducting a proportionality 
analysis and reviewing the burden sustained by the specific 
applicants.37 Instead, the ECtHR referred solely to economic necessity 
and quickly concluded that any interference was justified.38 In contrast, 
 
32 YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 161 (Intersentia 
nv, 2002). 
33 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 59 (Frans Pennings & 
Gijsbert Vonk eds., 2015). 
34 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 117–18. 
35 Id. ¶ 117. 
36 Id. ¶ 142. 
37 See id. ¶¶ 106–20. 
38 Id. ¶ 120. 
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in the case of Malysh and Others v. Russia,39 which pertained to 
Russia’s inability to repay sovereign bonds’ nominal value and interest, 
the ECtHR noted that an appropriate balancing exercise was required 
while taking into account the amount owed by the state to bondholders 
vis-à-vis other pressing budgetary expenses of priority.40 Similarly, 
although the ECtHR did in fact find that there was great volatility and 
difference between bondholders that would require a different 
treatment amongst them, the court nonetheless found this was justified 
due to the urgent situation Greece was in, even making reference to the 
“pari passu” clause that is indifferent for human rights considerations. 
This judgement has not been appealed to the Grand Chamber. That 
stated, it is the author’s view that even if the judgement had been 
appealed before the Grand Chamber, which may have corrected such 
shortcomings, nonetheless the Grand Chamber would unlikely come to 
a different conclusion. This is because it is evident through the 
ECtHR’s case law that when dealing with issues of financial crisis, the 
ECtHR will refrain from challenging state decisions that reflect major 
political choices relating to economic matters by resorting to the 
subsidiarity principle.41 Hence, the ECtHR will not challenge state 
decisions that are closely related to the sovereign power of a state, such 
as decisions relating to economic policy and sovereign default. This, in 
conjunction with the ECtHR’s prior case law stating that legitimate 
objectives of “public interest” may justify a compensation below the 
full market value,42 demonstrates that in light of the extreme 
circumstances of a sovereign default, a bond exchange would most 
likely be upheld despite the severe haircut it might impose.43 
 
39 Malysh and Others v. Russia, App. No. 30280/03, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 81. 
40 See also STEPHAN M. SCHILL & YUN I-KIM, Sovereign Bonds in Economic Crisis, 
Y.B. ON INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2010-2011 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013). 
41 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Judge, Eur. Ct. H.R. Lecture before the European Society 
of International Law, The European Court of Human Rights at a Time of Crisis in Europe 
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Sicilianos_speech_Translation 
.pdf. 
42 Lithgow v. United Kingdom., App. No. 9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81;9265/81; 9313/81; 
9405/81, 1986  Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Patrick Wautelet, The Greek Debt Restructuring and 
Property Rights. A Greek Tragedy for Investors? (2013), https://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream 
/2268/160460/1/Wautelet.pdf. 
43 See also Andreas Witte, The Greek Bond Haircut: Public and Private International 
Law and European Law Limits to Unilateral Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 9 MANCHESTER 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 307 (2012). 
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Thus, it is worth exploring whether investors would have a better 
chance of succeeding in their claims if they were to resort to investment 
tribunals by invoking investment treaty standards. 
II 
CLAIMING PROTECTION UNDER BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 
A. Definition: General Discussion 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are legally binding international 
agreements between two states establishing the terms and conditions 
mutually applicable for investments made by natural or legal persons.44 
Most BITs include guarantees and other provisions that regulate the 
terms and extent of the standard treatment to be awarded to foreign 
investors.45 Those guarantees are both general—referring to the 
standard treatment the investor would receive in the host state—and 
specific—particularly granting protection against specific types of 
danger that might occur in the host state.46 From a legal perspective, 
the treatment of the investor and his investment by the host state is 
evaluated based on the guarantee made by the host state to investors 
vis-à-vis a specific standard of treatment.47 The most common 
standards of treatment provided for under international investment 
treaties and investment codes are: (1) the most favored nation 
treatment, (2) fair and equitable treatment, and (3) treatment in 
accordance with the rules of international law.48 
B. Conditions for Claiming Protection Under BITs 
For an investor to be able to claim protection under a BIT, the 
following conditions must be cumulatively met: (1) the entrepreneur 
must qualify as a foreign investor under the BIT; (2) the investment 
must qualify as an investment under the BIT; and (3) a breach of the 
 
44 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 124 (Fabio Bassan ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). 
45 Id. 
46 PANAGIOTIS GKLAVINIS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 609 (Sakkoulas 
Publications 2009). 
47 FIONA BEVERIDGE, THE TREATMENT AND TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 232–35 (Manchester Univ. Press 2000). 
48 GKLAVINIS, supra note 46, at 611. 
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standard of treatment provided for by the BIT must have occurred.49 
While the first two conditions are mainly of a procedural nature, the 
third is a substantive issue. 
At this point, it is important to note that, despite significant 
differences among various BITs, there is a very strong trend towards 
their harmonization. If one takes into consideration that developed 
states—usually acting as the investors’ state—have the power to, and 
do, impose their terms on host states, one can begin to see that there are 
clear patterns evident in almost all BITs. 
C. Foreign Investor Under the BIT 
To bring a claim under a BIT, a natural or legal person must qualify 
as a foreign investor from a country which is party to a BIT with the 
host state. For natural persons, the decisive factor to determine whether 
they are a foreign investor is their nationality,50 while for legal persons 
both their place of incorporation and the place of effective management 
and control are taken into account.51 Hence, the investors in the 
Mamatas case, who were nationals of Greece, would not qualify as 
foreign investors and thus could not claim protection under any 
investment treaty. 
D. Protected Investment Under the BIT 
Here, the scope of the term “investment” requires further 
explanation as it relates to BITs. Most BITs contain broad definitions 
of protected investments and often include language such as “every 
kind of asset,” or “every kind of investment in the territory.”52 Such 
broad definitions usually include investments in real estate, stocks and 
 
49 Ursula Kriebaum, The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection 
under Investment Treaties, 10 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIB. [i], 383–404 (2011). 
50 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING 
INNOVATIONS (2008) (although some BITs refer to other criteria such as a requirement of 
residency or domicile). 
51 MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 132–34 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
52 Indicatively, the Greek-German BIT covers all capital investments that include “any 
kind of asset” and are by way of indication and not of limitation defined as: (i) interests on 
movable and immovable property and all other liens such as mortgages and hypothecations 
and other similar rights; (ii) shares and various interests in companies; (iii) fiscal claims or 
offers of an economic value; (iv) intellectual or industrial property rights, technical methods, 
trademarks; (v) rights deriving from allotments/concessions. 
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bonds, monetary claims, intellectual property, etc.53 It is questionable, 
however, whether portfolio investments are included in this definition. 
Indeed, portfolio investors assume commercial risks and are 
consequently not usually protected by the host state.54 
Including portfolio investments in the definition of investments 
under BITs would allow investors with a small percentage in a 
company and who do not have an interest or stake in the company’s 
management, but only aspire to receive a return on their investment, to 
claim protection under a BIT. 
Until recently, tribunals had not offered a definitive answer as to 
whether portfolio investments could be included in the definition of 
investments under BITs.55 That, however, changed with the ICSID 
tribunal’s (Tribunal) award in CMS v. Argentina, in which the old 
criterion of the exercise of effective management and control was set 
aside, and the language of the U.S.-Argentina BIT was analyzed with 
great attention. As the latter did not entail an exhaustive definition of 
what constituted an investment, both portfolio and foreign direct 
investments (FDI) were deemed to be included in the definition of 
investment.56 This decision is indicative of the trend to broadly 
interpret the definition of investments under BITs so that they include 
portfolio investments. Under such trend, the notion of investment does 
not connect the essence of investment with the exercise of effective 
management and control.57 Indeed, “many ICSID and other arbitral 
decisions . . . have progressively given a broader meaning to the 
 
53 See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 58 (2011). 
54 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD), THE 
MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT) TEMPLATE: INVESTMENT FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2012) (which expressly excludes portfolio investments); see 
also, SARA PENDJER, INVESTMENT STATUS OF SOVEREIGN BONDS: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF ICSID 16 (Ctr. Eur. Univ. 2016) (which discusses 
the debate of whether portfolio investments in all forms should constitute protected 
investments). 
55 See Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in 
International Investment Agreement, IISD (2008), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci 
_recent_dev.pdf. 
56 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award, ¶ 
56 (May 12, 2005). 
57 NOAH RUBINS, THE NOTION OF INVESTMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION, ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ISSUES 318 (Nobert Horn ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2004). 
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concept of investment,”58 while in Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine 
Republic,59 the Tribunal specifically found that portfolio investments 
were included within the scope of protection of the BIT.60 This, 
however, was questioned in the recent case of Poštová Banka, A.S. and 
Istrokapital SE v. the Hellenic Republic,61 where the Tribunal 
examined this question under the double-barreled test, namely it first 
examined the definition of investment under the wording of the specific 
BIT and, provided this test was met, it would proceed to examine the 
investment under the Salini criteria. This is the case we now turn to. 
E. Poštová Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. the Hellenic 
Republic 
Poštová Banka A.S., a banking institution registered in Slovakia and 
owned by Istrokapital S.E., a Cypriot entity, filed a claim against 
Greece in May 2013 before the ICSID.62 In early 2010, Poštová Banka 
purchased Greek bonds equal to €504 million from the secondary 
market and deposited such bonds in an account with the depository 
Clearstream Banking of Luxembourg, without retaining rights in any 
specific instrument but to a pool of fungible interests.63 At the time of 
purchase, these bonds did not contain CACs; CACs were forcibly 
introduced by the Bondholders Law No. 4050/2012. As a result, 
Poštová Banka was required to participate in the bond exchange, 
despite having expressed a dissenting opinion.64 
Before examining the merits of the case, the ICSID proceeded to 
examine the jurisdictional objections that the Greek government 
raised.65 Greece argued that the ICSID’s tribunal lacked subject matter, 
personal, and temporal jurisdiction.66 Greece also maintained that the 
claimants abused the tribunal’s process.67 In particular, Greece 
presented two arguments to contest the tribunal’s ratione materiae 
 
58 Joy Mining Machinery Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Final 
Award (Aug. 6, 2004). 
59 Abaclat et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Final Award (Dec. 29, 2016). 
60 Id. ¶ 65. 
61 Poštová Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, 
Final Award (Apr. 9, 2015). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. ¶ 59. 
64 Id. ¶ 63. 
65 Id. ¶ 91. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
ARGYROPOULOU (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  11:55 AM 
2018] International Arbitration and Greek Sovereign Debt: 191 
Poštová Banka v. Hellenic Republic 
jurisdiction: (1) that Istrokapital’s shareholding in Poštová Banka was 
not an investment under the Cyprus-Greece BIT,68 and (2) that Poštová 
Banka’s interests in Greek bonds did not fall within the scope of 
protected investments under the Slovakia-Greece BIT.69 ICSID 
examined these arguments in turn. 
1. Istorkapital’s Investment Under the Cyprus-Greece BIT 
Istorkapital countered Greece’s objection and argued that it in fact 
made an investment within the definition of the Cyprus-Greece BIT, 
which was not the shareholding in Poštová Banka, but rather the Greek 
bonds obtained by Poštová Banka.70 Indeed, Istorkapital claimed it 
indirectly invested in Greek bonds through Poštová Banka.71 Per 
Istorkapital, such investment fell within the scope of Art. 1.1. (c) of the 
Cyprus-Greece BIT as assets comprising monetary claims and 
contractual claims with an economic value.72 
The Tribunal examined previous case law on whether shareholders 
may raise claims for rights in assets held by companies whose share 
capital they own.73 From this examination, the Tribunal noted that there 
was no available case law to support such an argument.74 In fact, in 
previous cases, arbitral tribunals adopted a rather different view—
namely that a company should be distinct from its shareholders.75 
Indicatively, in BG. v. Argentina,76 the Tribunal found that BG had no 
direct claims stemming from the license agreements entered into by one 
of its subsidiaries.77 The same conclusion was also reached by the 
Tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina78 and Urbaser v. Argentina.79 
 
68 Id. ¶ 95. 
69 Id. ¶ 119. 
70 Id. ¶ 100. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. ¶ 228. 
73 Id. ¶¶ 228–42. 
74 Id. ¶ 246. 
75 HICEE, B.V. v. Slovak Rep., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Final Award (Oct. 
17, 2011). 
76 BG Grp. Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Dec. 24, 2007). 
77 Id. ¶ 144. 
78 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Final Award (Oct. 
31, 2011). 
79 Urbaser S.A. & Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. 
Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (Dec. 8, 2016). 
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Based on this case law, the Tribunal noted that while Istorkapital 
could pursue claims against measures taken against its assets that 
impair the value of its shareholding in Poštová [B]anka,”80 it did not 
have standing to claim damages for the assets held by Poštová Banka.81 
Consequently, as Istorkapital based its claim for jurisdiction solely on 
the basis of its indirect investment, the Tribunal dismissed all of 
Istrokapital’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the sole 
investor of Greek bonds was Poštová Banka.82 
2. Poštová Banka Investment Under the Greece-Slovakia BIT 
In examining whether Poštová Banka’s interests in the Greek bonds 
fell within the meaning of investment, the Tribunal primarily took note 
of the process by which Poštová Banka acquired the Greek bonds, 
noting that it was in the secondary market.83 Thereafter, the Tribunal 
examined the wording of Art. 1 of the Greece-Slovakia BIT and, in 
particular, it examined the definition of the term “investment” provided 
in the BIT: 
“Investment” means every kind of asset and in particular, though not 
exclusively includes: 
a) movable and immovable property and any other property 
rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges, 
b) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other 
form of participation in a company, 
c) loans, claims to money or to any performance under contract 
having a financial value, 
d) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and 
know-how, 
e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, 
including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit 
natural resources.84 
The claimants contended that their interest in the Greek bonds was 
included in the above definition of investment, which referred to “every 
kind of asset,” and in particular, referred to “loans” or “claims to 
 
80 Poštová Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, 
Final Award, ¶ 245 (Apr. 9, 2015). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. ¶ 246. 
83 Id. ¶¶ 250–51. 
84 Id. ¶ 278. 
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money.”85 Claimants noted that international law did not ascribe any 
particular meaning to the term “investment” and as such, the Tribunal 
should refer solely to the wording of Art. 1 of the BIT.86 Greece, on the 
other hand, argued that the term had an ascribed meaning under 
international law, and that the Tribunal should not search for a special 
definition under the BIT.87 
The Tribunal primarily acknowledged that, as per the claimants’ 
argument, the definition of the term “investment” is broad, noting 
however, that this should not be interpreted so that any and all 
categories of assets fall within such definition automatically.88 The fact 
that the list of assets is non-exhaustive did not allow the Tribunal to 
indefinitely expand the types of protected assets intended by the 
contracting states. Therefore, to discover whether the claimants’ rights 
in the Greek bonds were in fact included within the meaning of 
investment, as per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), the Tribunal was required to interpret the term in good faith, 
taking into account the text, context, and the object and purpose of the 
Greece-Slovakia BIT.89 The non-exhaustive list of protected assets 
contained in the definition should, therefore, be considered within the 
context of the BIT. Otherwise, such indicative list would be 
meaningless and useless, and to this end, the different wording of the 
protected assets found in the various Greek and non-Greek investments 
would be redundant.90 
The Tribunal noted that this indicative list of assets was the 
distinctive factor vis-à-vis Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic.91 In this 
case, the Tribunal predicated its judgement that portfolio investments 
constitute protected investments by reviewing the wording of a similar 
indicative list in the Italy-Argentina BIT.92 Such wording was 
significantly different from the Greece-Slovakia BIT as the list in the 
Italy-Argentina BIT was construed in a much more generic and broad 
 
85 Id. ¶ 279. 
86 Id. ¶ 280. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. ¶¶ 284–85. 
89 Id. ¶ 285. 
90 Id. ¶ 287. 
91 Id. ¶ 300. 
92 Id. 
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manner.93 As the Tribunal noted in Abaclat in reference to the 
indicative list in Art. 1 of the Italy-Argentina BIT: 
Firstly, this list covers an extremely wide range of investments, using 
a broad wording and referring to formulas such as “independent of 
the legal form adopted,” or “any other” kind of similar investment. It 
even contains a residual clause in lit. (f), encompassing “any right of 
economic nature conferred under law or contract.” In other words, 
the definition provided for in Article 1(1) is not drafted in a restrictive 
way.94 
In fact, the Italy-Argentina BIT made specific reference to 
“obligations, private or public titles,” which was invoked by the 
claimants in Abaclat.95 As no such reference was made in the Greece-
Slovakia BIT, which only refers to debentures issued by companies and 
not by the state, the claimants in the current case categorized their claim 
as “loans” and “claims to money.”96 To this end, the Tribunal in 
Poštová Banka AS and Istrokapital SE v. The Hellenic Republic asked 
whether sovereign bonds were equivalent to loans.97 The Tribunal 
answered in the negative as, unlike loan agreements where the parties 
are identified in the loan agreement, bonds are held by several investors 
anonymously and often exchange hands several times.98 The Tribunal 
also declined the claimants’ assertion that their interests in Greek bonds 
could be considered “claims to money.”99 The Tribunal noted that 
according to Art.1(1)(c) of the BIT, for a claim to money to arise, it 
must stem from a contract between the parties.100 In the present case, 
Poštová Banka had not entered into a contract with Greece because it 
acquired the Greek bonds in line with Law 2198/1994 concerning the 
setting-up and operation of the dematerialized system for the clearing 
and settlement of securities transactions over Greek sovereign bonds.101 
 
93 Id. ¶ 307. 
94 Abaclat et. al v. Argentina., ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Final Award, ¶ 354 (Dec. 29, 
2016). 
95 See Poštová Banka, A.S. v. Hellenic Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Final Award, ¶ 
302 (Apr. 9, 2015). 
96 Id. ¶¶ 308, 336. 
97 See id. ¶ 285. 
98 For a commentary on the reasoning of the Tribunal for the similarities between loans 
and bonds, see Anna O. Mitsou, Greek Debt Restructuring and Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Jurisdictional Stumbling Blocks for Bondholders, 33 J. INT’L ARB., 687, 687–
721 (2016). 
99 Poštová Banka, A.S. v. Hellenic Rep., Final Award, ¶ 343. 
100 See id. ¶ 306. 
101 Id. ¶ 345. 
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Hence, the Tribunal concluded that Poštová Banka’s interests in 
Greek bonds were not an investment under the Greece-Slovakia BIT.102 
Therefore, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of 
the application.103 
In 2015, Poštová Banka filed an application requesting the partial 
annulment of the Award rendered by the ICSID on April 9, 2015, by 
virtue of Articles 48(3) and 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention.104 
Poštová Banka claimed that the Tribunal had not stated the reasons on 
which the award was based because it had not explained why the 
proprietary rights acknowledged by the Tribunal did not fall within the 
wide definition of “investment.”105 In particular, Poštová Banka put 
forth three main arguments: “(i) that the reasoning of the tribunal did 
not allow the reader to follow how the tribunal proceeded from point A 
to point B, (ii) that the tribunal’s reasoning was so contradictory so as 
to amount to no reasoning at all and (iii) that the [T]ribunal’s errors 
were outcome-determinative.”106 
On September 29, 2016, the ICSID ad hoc Committee delivered its 
decision on Poštová Banka AS’s application for partial annulment of 
the Award, dismissing the application.107 
As is evident from the above, the wording of a BIT is decisive as to 
whether sovereign bonds fall within the protective scope of investments 
under the given BIT and allow the bondholder to claim compensation 
on these premises. The Tribunal’s findings in Poštová Banka, A.S. and 
Istrokapital, SE v. Hellenic Republic are in line with the ICSID’s 
previous ruling in Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and Others v. Argentine,108 
where the Tribunal noted that a restrictive reading is required, “if the 
consent given by a state indicates that certain types of investment 
should be excluded from the protection of the ICSID arbitration 
mechanism” to tackle difficulties relating to the substantive side of a 
case (although it stipulated that tribunals should refrain from a 
restrictive reading of the jurisdictional provisions of the ICSID 
 
102 Id. ¶ 350. 
103 Id. 
104 Poštová Banka, A.S. v. Hellenic Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Annulment 
Proceeding, ¶ 86 (Sept. 29, 2016). 
105 Id. ¶¶ 86–87. 
106 Id. ¶ 88. 
107 Id. ¶ 160. 
108 See Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and Others v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013). 
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Convention when such reading cannot be founded on the Convention 
itself).109 Although this decision is not binding on other Tribunals, as 
the doctrine of precedent does not exist under international investment 
law, this award is expected to affect Tribunal’s decisions on the said 
topic.110 
This award received criticism for its very restrictive interpretation, 
especially in relation to its finding that bonds are not loan agreements. 
Sovereign bonds constitute a form of financing for the states and, in 
particular, a form of loan agreements. Hence, the award’s reasoning 
appears to be unjustifiably overly restrictive.111 
F. Greece’s Main Types of BITs 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development database, Greece is comparatively advanced in its use of 
various categories of investment treaties.112 Indeed, Greece has signed 
forty-seven BITs, one of which was terminated and replaced (Romania) 
and four of which have been signed but are not yet in force (Argentina, 
Congo, Kuwait, and Kazakstan).113 Most of the BITs are either with 
countries outside the European Union (EU) or with Central and East 
European countries, which became EU members after 2000 (there are 
eleven such BITs, the majority of which were pre-existing, but 
renegotiated in line with EU requirements). As an EU member state, 
Greece is party to some seventy-four other International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs), entered into by the EU in keeping with association 
and free trade agreements, as well as with (or in the framework of) 
various international organizations and agencies.114 
Out of the forty-seven BITs that Greece signed and are currently in 
force, none contain as extensive of wording as the Italy-Argentine BIT. 
 
109 Id. ¶ 461. 
110 Anna O. Mitsou, Greek Debt Restructuring and Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Jurisdictional Stumbling Blocks for Bondholders, 33 J. INT’L ARB., 687, 687–721 (2016). 
111 See id. 
112 See the list of the respective IIAs: International Investment Agreements, UNITED 
NATIONS: UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2018). 
113 Greece: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), International Investment Agreements 
Navigator, UNITED NATIONS: UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA 
/CountryBits/81 (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
114 EU: International Investment Agreements (IIAs), International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, UNITED NATIONS: UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad 
.org/IIA/CountryGroupingTreaties/28#iiaInnerMenu. 
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Twenty-one of Greece’s BITs115 have wording similar to the Greece-
Slovakia BIT. Two of Greece’s BITs make absolutely no reference to 
loans or claims in money,116 sixteen BITs117 refer to “loans connected 
to an investment,” and two BITs which either make no reference or 
entail specific exclusions from certain claims to money and specific 
loans.118 In light of the ICSID’s award in Poštová Banka AS and 
Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic, investors will have difficulty 
demonstrating that bonds acquired from the secondary market fall 
within the protective scope of BITs, although the reference to loans 
connected to an investment is very closely linked to sovereign debt,119 
which makes it more likely that a tribunal will accept such reference as 
a protected investment. However, if investors manage to overcome this 
hurdle, will they be able to finally gain compensation? This is the 
question we now turn to. 
G. BIT’s Standard of Treatment 
As explained above, the third condition for an investor to be able to 
effectively claim protection under a BIT is that he must demonstrate 
there was a breach of a treaty standard that negatively affected his 
investment. In practical terms, a standard of treatment consists of a set 
of principles to be observed in their letter and spirit by the host state in 
 
115 BITS with Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Korea, Serbia, Russia, Poland, Morocco, Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
116 See Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt- 
Greece, July 16, 1993, 1895 U.N.T.S. 32311; Agreement between the Government of the 
Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Greece-Iran, Mar. 
13, 2002, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1464. 
117 BITs with Azerbaijan, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, Georgia, India, Syria, South Africa, 
Moldova, Lithuania, Lebanon, Latvia, Jordan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates (although 
the BIT also refers to rights granted under public law or contract), and Romania (although 
this BIT refers to long-term loans). 
118 Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Greece-Mex., Nov. 30, 2000, 2449 U.N.T.S. 44072; Agreement Between the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, Greece-Viet., Oct. 13, 
2008, 2914 U.N.T.S. 50741. 
119 Rachel D. Thrasher & Kevin P. Gallagher, Mission Creep: The Emerging Role of 
International Investment Agreements in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION 
& DEV. 257, 274 (2015). 
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its relations with foreign investors.120 In other words, standards of 
treatment are meant to govern the contracting parties’ behavior and, 
more specifically, to preserve and protect investors’ rights. However, 
this is not always the case; quite a number of breaches of the respective 
principles occur, leading to disputes among parties to investment 
treaties. 
The standard of treatment provided for by BITs mainly consists 
of:121 
• national treatment (non-discrimination between domestic and 
foreign investors in light of the fiscal regime and other related 
measures); 
• most favoured nation treatment—MFN (equal treatment of all 
foreign investors acting in same or similar conditions; no less 
favourable treatment on the basis of investors’ nationality); 
• fair and equitable treatment for all parties concerned; and 
• full protection and security for the foreign investment. 
Most BITs also stipulate the need for: 
• not allowing any direct or indirect expropriation without providing 
adequate and effective compensation; 
• allowing the repatriation and general transfer of investors’ capital 
out of the host country; 
• not imposing conditions based on performance requirements; for 
example, employment and training requirements; and 
• allowing for neutral arbitration as the main means for the 
settlement of disputes, if and when treaty standards of protected is 
not upheld. 
H. Salient Features of Greece BITs122 
As previously stated, Greece signed over forty BITs that contain 
both similar as well as differing language. Some of the common 




120 See United Nations, Dispute Settlement: State-State, United Nations Conference On 
Trade and Development, UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INT’L INV. AGREEMENTS, 13 
(2003), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20031_en.pdf. 
121 See generally Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment 201–05 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 2010). 
122 See generally Nicholas Moussas, Stratos Voulgaridis & Charalampos Kondis, 
Greece: Overview of investment treaty programme, GLOBAL ARB. REV., http://global 
arbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000114/greece (last updated Oct. 21, 2016). 
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Non-discrimination 
All BITs explicitly limit the application of the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle, insofar as the benefits resulting from Greece’s EU 
membership are concerned.123 Also, some BITs, entered into mostly 
with developing countries, stipulate the non-application of MFN to 
preferences or privileges extended to developing countries in line with 
the international agreements in the field.124 
While the large majority of the BITs provide that non-discrimination 
is applicable only to “investments,” several of them have a larger scope, 
this principle covering the “returns on investment,” too.125 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Most Greek BITs broadly describe the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (FET) as being applicable to the investments made by 
investors of each party to the treaty. It is interesting to note, however, 
that in the German-Greek BIT, there is no explicit reference to the FET. 
Expropriation 
Out of all of Greece’s BITs which expressly provide for protection 
against direct expropriation, only four of them contain similar 
protective provisions for indirect expropriation. While the large 
majority of Greek BITs require that any expropriation be subject to the 
“due process of law,” three of them (including the one with Germany) 
do not contain such a requirement, stipulating only that expropriation 
 
123 In particular, the wording provided in the MFN clause of BITs signed by Greece reads 
as “[s]uch treatment shall not relate to privileges which either Contracting Party accords to 
investors of third States on account of its membership of, or association with, a customs or 
economic union, a common market, a free trade area or similar institutions.” Id. 
124 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 3 ¶ 4, Greece-S. Afr., Nov. 19, 
1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1480; see also 
Agreement Between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the 
Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 4, Cuba-
Greece, June 18, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty File/1480. 
125 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the 
Government of the Russian Federation for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Greece-Russ., art. 2, ¶ 4, June 30, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad 
.org/Download/TreatyFile/903; see also Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and 
the Hellenic Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
art. 1, ¶ 2(b), Greece-Turk., Jan. 20, 2000, http://investmentpolicyhub.uncta.org/Down 
load/TreatyFile/1477. 
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may be done in the public interest.126 As to the right of compensation, 
in general, it must be equivalent to the market value of the tangible or 
intangible object of expropriation and must be “prompt, adequate and 
effective.”127 
Other Substantive Protections 
Greek BITs also contain other provisions related to investor 
protection. One such provision deals with the free transfer of payments: 
all BITs provide for unrestricted and immediate transfer of 
investments, including their returns, in freely convertible currencies. 
It should also be noted that according to most Greek BITs, the 
contracting parties have the obligation not to unjustifiably intervene in 
the management, use, disposal, etc. of investments made by investors 
from the other state.128 
We shall now briefly examine the contents of the aforementioned 
standards of treatment found in the majority of BITs signed by Greece, 
as well as their potential infringement. 
 
126 See Vertrug zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Königreich 
Griechenland über die Förderung und den gegenseitigcen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen, Ger.-
Greece, art. 3, ¶ 2, Mar. 27, 1961, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download 
/TreatyFile/1483; Accord Entre Le Gouvernement De La Rebublique Hellenique Et Le 
Gouvernement Du Royaume Du Maroc Concernant L’ Encouragement Et La Protection 
Reciproques Des Investissements, Greece-Morocco, art. 4, ¶ 1, Feb. 28, 1994, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1329; see also Nicholas 
Moussas, Stratos Voulgaridis & Charalampos Kondis, Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Greece, GLOBAL ARB. REV., http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000114 
/greece (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (referencing to the Greece-Albania BIT also; that, 
however, does make reference in art. 4(2) that “[t]he legality of any such expropriation 
nationalization or comparable measure and the amount of compensation shall be subject to 
review by due process of law”). 
127 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Croat.-Greece, art. 4, ¶ 1, Oct. 18, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad 
.org/Download/TreatyFile/15; see also Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Chile and the Government of the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Chile-Greece, art. 6, ¶ 1(c), July 10, 1996, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/859. 
128 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Greece-U.A.E., art. 3, ¶ 2, art. 4, ¶ 2, May 6, 2014, http://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/679; Agreement Between the Government of 
the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Hellenic Republic of the Mutual 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Greece-S. Kor., art. 3, ¶ 2, Jan. 25, 1995, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5357. 
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I. Potential Breaches of the Standards of Treatment 
Non-discrimination 
The non-discrimination principle has two components meant 
primarily to ensure full and fair competition among all investors, be 
they domestic or foreign, namely: (i) national treatment (regime), and 
(ii) the most-favored-nation clause. 
National Treatment 
According to the national treatment (NT) principle, foreign investors 
shall be treated no less favorably than domestic ones.129 A key element 
in examining the difference of treatment awarded to investors of the 
defaulting state versus those awarded to foreign investors is the terms 
of the restructuring. Consequently, in cases of sovereign debt default 
and restructuring, an NT breach may occur when domestic bondholders 
receive better terms than those offered to foreign bondholders (e.g., 
they sustain a smaller haircut). 
There are various policy reasons for a state to award preferential 
treatment to domestic investors, including reviving the domestic 
financial system, providing liquidity, and managing financial and 
monetary risk during a subsequent economic recovery.130 These policy 
measures exist because their absence may trigger a banking crisis 
which can entail significant foreign exchange outflows and deposit 
flight, as we have seen in the case of Greece. Evidence of this can be 
seen in the cases relating to the Russian and Argentinean financial 
crisis, where domestic investors were treated more favorably than 
foreign investors.131 Such was also the case when, during the 1997 
financial and monetary crisis of the peso in Mexico, Mexico facilitated 
the purchase of financial instruments denominated in Mexican pesos 
and not similar financial instruments denominated in U.S. dollars. 
Notably, instruments denominated in Mexican pesos were owned by 
Mexican investors alone,132 and thus, foreign investors were indirectly 
excluded from the purchase. Although, the ICSID Tribunal did not 
examine the merits of such arguments in the case Fireman’s Fund 
 
129 Nicolas F Diebold, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, 
60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 831, 831 (2011). 
130 See Ann Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for 
Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795, 798 (2004). 
131 Id. at 799. 
132 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 
(2002), ¶ 56 (July 17, 2003). 
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Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States,133 it did note that 
“such claim might have given rise to a claim by an investor under 
Articles 1102 (National Treatment) . . .  or Article 1405 (National 
Treatment) of the NAFTA.”134 
However, concluding that a national investor is awarded preferential 
treatment within the context of sovereign restructuring is easier said 
than done, given the wide diversity between the terms of the various 
bonds.135 For example, in the case of the Greek Haircut, as was 
demonstrated in the case of Mamatas and Others v. Greece, Greek 
creditors did not receive any different or preferential treatment.136 In 
this case, it can be said that Greek creditors in fact received less 
favorable treatment than foreign investors,137 as they were subjected to 
a “double-adjustment.” A double adjustment occurred in that, not only 
were Greek creditors affected by the Bond Exchange and the reduction 
in the face value of their bonds, but they were also affected by the 
negative repercussions of the financial crisis, including, among other 
things, slow growth, growing unemployment, and high interest rates.138 
Most-Favored-Nation 
The MFN clause, which can be found in virtually all BITs and most 
other international investment treaties (IITs), requires that all foreign 
investors be treated alike in the same or similar circumstances, and that 
no less favorable treatment is awarded to any foreign investor on the 
basis of their nationality.139 
In the case of Greece, for instance, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), its largest creditor at the time of the bond exchange, holding 
more than twenty percent of Greece’s debt, was exempted from the 
bond exchange.140 The same applies for the IMF and EU member 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. ¶ 203. 
135 MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 274 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
136 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 138. 
137 Julian Schumacher, Marcos Chamon, & Christoph Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: 
Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für 
Socialpolitik (2015), Ökonomische Entwicklung – Theorie und Politik – Session: Asset and 
Bond Markets, No. B09-V3. 
138 Aldo Caliari, Risk Associated with Trends in the Treatment of Sovereign Debt in 
Bilateral Trade and Investment Treaties, UNCTAD 211 (2009). 
139 Pia Acconci, Most-Favored Nation Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L 
INV. LAW 363 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
140 Anna O. Mitsou, Greek Debt Restructuring and Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Jurisdictional Stumbling Blocks for Bondholders, 33 J. INT’L ARB., 693, 687–721, (2016); 
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states’ central banks which did not take analogous haircuts on their 
Greek bonds, as all other bondholders did.141 
Indeed, the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program 
announcement stipulated, “[t]he Eurosystem intends to clarify in the 
legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the 
same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors, with respect 
to bonds issued by Euro area countries, and purchased by the 
Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance 
with the terms of such bonds.”142 The ECB exchanged its previous 
Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) with new ones, with the same 
nominal value and terms, and without any CACs, as opposed to all 
other bondholders that participated in the haircut which received a 
steep reduction on the face value of their bonds.143 
This discrimination between institutional investors and other 
investors holding the same instruments may amount to a breach of the 
MFN standard.144 It is questionable, however, whether Greece actually 
had a choice or the power not to accept such discrimination. 
Similarly, a breach of the MFN Treaty can be found due to the 
difference in treatment of Greek-law governed sovereign bonds and 
foreign-law governed sovereign bonds, as the Greek Bondholders Act 
only affected the former bonds and not the latter. 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
An alternative basis of claim for investors is the well-established 
treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment (FET). Despite the long 
and general application of FET, the content of such a standard is not 
clearly defined.145 The FET clause, which is included in most of the 
more recent IIAs, typically grants investors protection of their 
reasonable expectations that they have relied upon to make the 
 
see also Ready for the ruck?, THE ECONOMIST (2017), http://www.economist.com 
/node/21533368/all-comments. 
141 Id. 
142 See European Central Bank Press Release, Technical Features of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120 
906_1.en.html. 
143 IOANNIS GLINAVOS, Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the 
Financial Crisis and the Future of Regulation, in ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH IN FINANCE AND 
BANKING LAW 143 (Routledge 2013). 
144 Id. 
145 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (2010). 
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investment, freedom from interference and coercion, transparency, due 
process, and good faith conduct.146 
With respect to bond exchanges, a concern has been expressed that 
although such bond exchanges are now common practice in debt 
restructurings they may, nonetheless, violate the FET. There are a 
number of justifications for such concern. Significantly, bond 
exchanges could face allegations of lack of transparency and that they 
are coercive. Most scholars, in addition, consider the “take-it-or-leave-
it” approach followed in restructuring proceedings as being in breach 
of the good faith and due process principle in the absence of serious 
restructuring negotiations.147 
In other words, the FET aims to create a stable and secure 
environment for investments. The above standard has been reiterated 
many times by various tribunals and courts.148 Indicatively, the 
UNICITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law) in its case of OEPC v. Ecuador stated that there is “an obligation 
not to alter the legal business environment in which the investment has 
been made.”149 In addition, in the cases relating to Argentina’s 
sovereign default, the tribunals expressly stated the importance of a 
stable and transparent economic environment and the need for the 
reasonable expectations of investors to be upheld. Specifically, in 
LG&E v. Argentina,150 the tribunal referred to the time element of those 
expectations and noted that investor expectations are founded on the 
circumstances present in the host state at the time the investment was 
made.151 
It is important to mention here that before the beginning of the Greek 
crisis, the yields of the ten-year Greek bonds were ten to forty basis 
points above the ten-year German bonds, only to explode to 400 basis 
points in January 2010.152 Indicatively, in 2007, the interest spreads of 
the ten-year Greek bonds were at approximately 0.2 percentage points, 
 
146 WAIBEL, supra note 135, at 711–59; see also Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, ¶ 420 (Oct. 31, 2012). 
147 WAIBEL, supra note 135, at 711–59. 
148 CHIARA GIORGETTI, THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 101 (Brill Njhoff 2012). 
149 Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Rep. of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 (2004), Award, ¶ 240 (Oct. 5, 2012). 
150 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E Int’l Inc. v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1, Award (July 25, 2007). 
151 Id. ¶ 127.  
152 Heather D. Gibson, Stephan G. Hall, & George S. Tavlas, The Greek financial crisis: 
Growing imbalances and sovereign spreads, 31 J. INT’L MONEY AND FIN. 498, 503 (2012).   
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while they rose to 0.5 percentage points in late 2008, and to 6.7 
percentage points in the second half of 2010.153 As such, the investors 
that bought Greek bonds before the crisis reasonably anticipated to be 
paid the entire face value of their bonds plus interest on maturity, and 
were greatly surprised by the Greek haircut that completely annulled 
their expectations, undermining the legal framework of Greek bonds. 
These bondholders may have a claim against Greece for breach of fair 
and equitable treatment. 
The same cannot be said for bondholders that bought or continued 
to buy Greek bonds after the Greek economic crisis had begun to 
unfold. Indeed, an investor cannot disregard and must take into account 
that the host state faces significant economic problems. Indicatively, in 
Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay,154 the Tribunal noted that an 
experienced businessman could and should have conducted thorough 
research prior to investing and that he should have been more 
conservative in investing in a country suffering serious economic 
problems.155 This principle was reiterated in the aforementioned case, 
CMS v. Argentina,156 where the Tribunal held that, in order to 
determine the scope of protection that should be granted to an investor 
by virtue of a BIT, the results of abnormal conditions caused by the 
financial crisis in Argentina should be taken in account.157 The Tribunal 
specifically noted that the effects of the financial crisis should, to a 
certain extent, be taken into account as part of the business risk that 
was assumed by the claimant when he invested in Argentina.158 The 
Tribunal also noted that not considering such effects within the 
business risk taken by the investor would lead to an unjustifiably 
unequivocal result, as the investor would not share any of the costs of 
the crisis, but would instead receive immunity from such costs, and that 
this would be tantamount to an insurance policy against business 
risk.159 
 
153 See generally Gunther Tichy, Credit Rating Agencies: Part of the Solution or Part of 
the Problem?, INTERECONOMICS (2011). 
154 Olguin v. Paraguay, Case No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 26, 2001). 
155 Id. ¶ 75. 
156 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award 
(May 12, 2005). 
157 Id. ¶ 244; see also Peter Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct 
of the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, ICLQ, Vol. 55, 543, July 
2006. 
158 CMS Gas Transmission Co., Final Award ¶ 248. 
159 Id. 
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In addition to the disappointment of an investors’ expectations, the 
unilateral and retroactive introduction of the CAC to all Greek-law 
governed bonds is also troubling. Indeed, the imposition of new 
conditions, placed retroactively through law has troubled investment 
tribunals on several occasions. In the case of Total S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, Argentina retroactively eliminated a tax exemption from 
applying export customs duties to production in Tierra del Fuego 
through the enactment of the Emergency Law in early 2002.160 This 
was considered a breach of FET. Similarly, in the case of ATA 
Construction Industrial and Trading Company v. Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, the Tribunal found that the retroactive application of the new 
Jordanian Arbitration Law, which effectively led to the extinguishment 
of the arbitration clause in the contract in question, was in breach of 
treaty standards.161 Hence, investors in Greek bonds could effectively 
claim that the retroactive introduction of CACs in their bonds, which 
forced approximately twenty percent of dissenting investors to accept 
a haircut on their bonds, was a breach of FET162 due to the 
disappointment of investors’ expectations, the lack of due process, and 
the lack of good faith.163 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the standard of FET is also found 
in customary international law.164 Initially, there was much debate as 
to the level of protection secured by customary law as compared to the 
one provided by BITs, but investment treaties often merely restate 
duties recognized by customary international law using slightly 
different language.165 The doctrine of “fair and equitable treatment” 
established by customary law would, however, be of little relevance to 
the case of the Greek haircut, as customary law did not protect portfolio 
 
160 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Award (Nov. 27, 2013). 
161 ATA Constr., Indus. and Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/2, Award, (May 18, 2010). 
162 Andrea Carlevaris, Rocio Digon, The Argentinean Bonds Saga, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 630 (Attila Tanzi et al. 
eds., 2016). 
163 WAIBEL, supra note 135, at 752. 
164 See OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, 
OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (OECD Publishing 2004), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435. But see Patrick Dumberry, The Formation And 
Identification Of Rules Of Customary International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 161 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016). 
165 FRITZ ALEXANDER MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 510 (Clarendon Press 
4th ed. 1982). 
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investors that ought to have been aware of commercial risks and 
protected themselves accordingly.166 
Expropriation 
Another standard of treatment that may be violated in cases of 
sovereign debt restructuring or default is that of the prohibition of direct 
or indirect expropriation—unless appropriate compensation is paid. 
Although BITs always provide special protection against expropriation 
and codify a lex specialis against expropriation,167 they nonetheless 
hardly ever contain a definition of the term, relying on the 
interpretation granted by customary international law or arbitration 
tribunals.168 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), expropriation is defined as “substantial 
wealth deprivation.”169 The ICSID considers expropriation as a 
“taking” of any kind, which can be direct in cases of nationalization, 
title, or physical seizure, or indirect in such cases where the ownership 
of the investment remains with the investor, but the investments value 
is diminished.170 Indirect expropriation can be difficult to recognize; 
hence, international jurisprudence has set out certain criteria that are 
deemed conclusive to the existence of indirect expropriation. One such 
decisive criterion refers to the impact of a state measure on the investor 
and the rights stemming from the investment.171 Such criterion was 
used by the Tribunal in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. 
United Mexican States172 to decide whether an indirect expropriation 
had occurred.173 Similarly, Professor G. C. Christie, in analyzing two 
 
166 Sornarajah, supra note 121, at 210. 
167 W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation” and Its Valuation 
in the BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115 (2005). 
168 SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
95 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014). 
169 OECD, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment 
Law 9 (Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 2004/4, 2004). 
170 Allahyar Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected, in THE WORK 
OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 70 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994). 
171 As noted by the Tribunal in the case of Tippets v. Iran, indirect expropriation “may 
occur under international law through interference by a State in the use of that property or 
with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property is not affected.” 
Starrett Housing Corp., Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing Int’l, Inc. v. Iran, Bank 
Oman, Bank Mellat, Bank Markazi, Iran–US CTR, Case No. 24, Award at 225 (1983). 
172 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, (May 29, 2003). 
173 Id. ¶ 115. 
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decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia174 and the Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Claims,175 used these criteria to conclude that indirect 
expropriation might exist.176 In other words, although a state may 
purport not to interfere with property rights when, by the state’s actions 
or measures, such rights are rendered so useless, those rights may be 
considered expropriated.177 
In light of the above, the consequences of the state measures and the 
degree of interference sustained by investors because of such measures 
are decisive in determining whether a direct expropriation exists. 
Further, more criteria have been adopted in the OECD legal 
framework, including the character of governmental measures, the 
purpose and context of the respective measures, as well as, the 
interference of those measures with reasonable investment 
expectations.178 As discussed, Greece has entered into very few BITs 
which reference indirect expropriation, but the standard may still be 
covered by the protection provided by such BITs on the basis of the 
“tantamount clause.”179 
However, not every measure interfering with an investor’s right will 
be tantamount to expropriation.180 In fact, state measures will, prima 
facie, be a lawful exertion of the government’s powers,181 despite that 
they might significantly affect foreign interests.182 To this end, foreign 
investments can be subjected to taxation and trade restrictions, 
 
174 Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926 
P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 7 (May 25, 1926). 
175 Norway v. United States, IRIAA 307 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922). 
176 G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 38 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307 (1962). 
177 Id. 
178 Apurba Khatiwada, Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment 18 (2008), 
http://www.ksl.edu.np/cpanel/pics/indirect_expropriation_apurba.pdf; see also OECD, 
supra note 169. 
179 Reisman & Sloane, supra note 167, at 118. 
180 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 6 ed. 2003). 
181 But see MIGUEL SOLANES & ANDREI JOURAVLEV, REVISITING PRIVATIZATION, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, AND WATER 60, U.N. Doc. 
[E/]LC/L.2827-P, U.N. Sales No. 07.II.G.151 (2007) (The opposite theory of “Sole Effects 
Doctrine,” whereby the purpose of the regulatory measure is irrelevant and should not be 
taken into account to establish indirect expropriation, but solely whether the measure 
significantly deprives investors of his rights from the investment.). 
182 BROWNLIE, supra note 180. 
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including quotas, licenses, or devaluation.183 Similarly, the American 
Law Institute noted in the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States that actions commonly accepted as falling within 
the police power of the states shall not amount to an expropriation and 
therefore will not allow an affected investor to claim compensation to 
the extent that such measures are not discriminatory.184 The above was 
fully reiterated in the context of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
in Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, which added that, 
apart from not being discriminatory, a state measure should also not be 
designed “to cause the alien to abandon the property to the state or to 
sell it at a distress price . . .”185 so as not to amount to expropriation.186 
At this point, an important question must be raised: can Greece’s 
debt haircut be considered an indirect expropriation? We shall venture 
an answer to this question by making a parallel presentation of cases 
involving Greece and Argentina. 
In exploring this question, the first issue to be clarified is whether 
the Greek measure of swapping initial bonds for bonds with a lower 
face value was indeed a sovereign act. In this respect, it is important to 
refer to the ruling of the ICSID in Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, 
where it was, inter alia, held that only unilateral measures specifically 
adopted as an expression of public authority could result in 
expropriation and mere breach of contractual obligations by the host 
state does not give rise to a claim for expropriation.187 Indeed, unless it 
is demonstrated that the state has acted beyond its role as contractual 
party, and has also acted as a sovereign exercising authority, any breach 
on the host state’s part would only result in a breach of contract.188 
In this regard, it is worth revisiting the case of the Argentine 
Restructuring and the aforementioned cases brought under the Italy-
Argentina BIT, and more particularly the Abaclat et al. v. Argentine 
 
183 Id. 
184 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
185 OECD, supra note 169, at 19. 
186 ESCARCENA, supra note 168. 
187 Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 
Arbitration Award, ¶ 278 (Dec. 22, 2003). 
188 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No.ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 261 (Apr. 22, 2005) 12 ICSID Rep. 297 (2007). 
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Republic case.189 This case revolved around the Argentine financial 
crisis of 2001–2005 and in particular, around the bonds restructuring 
that occurred.190 The Tribunal also carefully examined the question of 
whether the Argentine haircut was nothing more than a breach of 
contract or whether Argentina’s acts could constitute breach of certain 
standards of protection awarded by the BIT.191 The Tribunal reasoned 
that BITs are not meant to set aside or correct contractual remedies, but 
rather are meant to further impose general treaty obligations for the 
protection of foreign investors.192 As such, the Tribunal found that the 
underlying dispute did not merely relate to a contractual breach of 
Argentina’s payment obligations from the bonds, “but from the fact that 
it intervened as a sovereign by virtue of its state power to modify its 
payment obligations towards its creditors.”193 The Tribunal 
acknowledged that there was no justification for such modifications on 
the basis of the contract. Thus, Argentina’s actions were the expression 
of sovereignty and investors’ claims arising from such were treaty 
claims.194 
The same conclusion may also be reached in Greece’s case, where 
not only was the second haircut the result of extensive pressure from 
Greece and the EU institutions on major bondholders, but also (and 
perhaps more importantly) because Greece retroactively imposed and 
triggered CACs, thus compelling all Greek-law bondholders to accept 
and participate in the bond exchange. In this regard, it is obvious 
Greece exercised its sovereign power, especially when imposing 
CACs, and there was no contractual justification for the bondholders 
“being forced” to accept the haircut. As such, Greece’s decision will 
most likely be deemed a sovereign act; consequently, there is a need to 
examine if such an act can be considered as being within Greece’s 
legitimate state powers. The Tribunal will determine if this act so falls 
within legitimate state powers, taking into account the extreme 
financial crisis that Greece was facing and the urgent need to secure 
funding, which was only possible if the bond exchange was successful. 
That stated, it is still questionable whether the retroactive modification 
 
189 Abaclat and Others v. Argentina (formerly Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. Arg. 
Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 
2011). 
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191 Id. ¶ 316. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. ¶ 324. 
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of the bond terms through the introduction of CACs can be considered 
to fall within Greece’s legitimate state powers, as this would allow 
states to escape liability for not honoring their assumed obligations. 
As previously stipulated, for arbitral tribunals to conclude there was 
an indirect expropriation, each case is examined ad hoc and several 
elements are taken into account, including and most importantly, the 
effect and degree of interference that the measure had on the investor. 
As discussed above, under the FET, the Greek haircut greatly 
interfered with the reasonable and investment-backed expectations of 
the bondholders to retrieve the entire face value and interest of their 
bonds. Hence, if the effect the haircut had on investors (especially 
opposing investors) was significant, then bondholders (especially 
opposing bondholders) might have a prima facie case against Greece 
for expropriation. 
The decisive element in determining whether the imposition of 
CACs and the haircut can constitute an indirect expropriation is 
whether or not the sovereign act resulted in substantial economic loss 
of the value of the investment, even if the state did not actually obtain 
title or right over the investment.195 In order to determine the effect a 
state measure has had on investors, tribunals often conduct a 
“substantial deprivation” test196 to explore the degree of diminished 
value in a haircut, and would thus in this case evaluate the size of the 
Greek haircut.197 To calculate the losses investors would incur as a 
consequence of the recent Greek debt restructuring, the most 
appropriate formula is the one suggested by Federico Sturzenegger and 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer.198 The formula calculates the actual losses (H) 
sustained by the investors when a country (i) exits default at time (t) 
and issues new debt in exchange for the old debt at an interest rate (rti) 
at the exit from default, the following equation could be used:199 
H= 1- Present value of New Debt (rit) 
  Present value of Old Debt (rit) 
 
195 BROWNLIE, supra note 180, at 534. 
196 Peter D. Isakoff, Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International 
Investments, 3 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 189, 344  (2013). 
197 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES – STANDARDS OF TREATMENT (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009). 
198 STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 4, at 6. 
199 Id. 
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The above formula is most suited for restructurings that occur prior 
to a country’s default (when no acceleration of payment has taken 
place) and, therefore, there is no reason to take the face value of the old 
debt into consideration.200 Based on such calculations, the losses 
sustained by investors vary greatly depending on the maturity of the 
bond and how they acquired it. For example, several investors have 
acquired the bond in the secondary market below face value. Generally 
speaking, the losses sustained by investors reached seventy percent, 
although, as stipulated by the ECtHR in the Mamatas and Others v. 
Greece case, to calculate the losses sustained by investors, the value of 
the bonds at the date of the bond exchange should have been taken into 
account—a value which, at the time, was below face value.201 This 
criterion is of particular importance, since, if the interference is not 
significant, the Tribunal is unlikely to find expropriation has taken 
place. Indicatively, in the case Waste Management v. Mexico,202 the 
Tribunal noted that non-payment of debts was not sufficient to 
constitute expropriation.203 
If an expropriation is indeed found, the Tribunal will examine 
whether such expropriation is lawful under the applicable BIT.204 This 
question is critical, as it will determine the extent of compensation that 
investors are entitled to.205 In the case of unlawful expropriation, the 
investor is entitled to reparation for all damages sustained, as opposed 
to lawful expropriation where the investor is only entitled to “fair 
compensation.”206 The majority of BITs provide that for an 
expropriation to be lawful, the state measure must serve a public 
purpose, must not be discriminatory, must follow due process, and must 
grant the investor appropriate compensation.207 At present, the 
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measures taken by the Greek government, including both the 
introduction of CACs as well as the bond exchange have already been 
considered to be for a legitimate public purpose by the ECtHR, namely 
financial stability.208 However, as previously discussed, the 
implementation of the bond exchange can be deemed discriminatory 
and in violation of due process given the lack of actual negotiations for 
the debt restructuring. 
In conclusion, as shown above, bondholders will have difficulty 
proving that an indirect expropriation did, in fact, take place. This will 
largely depend on the effects of the bond exchange on investors. If, 
however, an indirect expropriation is found to have taken place in the 
case of the Greek haircut or the imposition of CACs, then Greece would 
be obligated to pay compensation to all investors. 
“Umbrella” Clauses 
Apart from the aforementioned specific protection against 
expropriation awarded under practically all BITs, investors may also 
be able to invoke BIT protection on other bases. One test followed by 
case law is the existence of a pacta sunt servanda, also known as an 
umbrella clause in BITs.209 Under this clause, a host state undertakes to 
abide by other obligations it has assumed in relation to protected 
investments.210 All commitments undertaken by the host state towards 
the investors must be observed.211 Umbrella clauses are intended to 
place all contractual terms under the “umbrella” of international law, 
granting investors protection under the BIT and not merely under 
domestic law.212 
The very existence of an umbrella clause elevates any contractual 
commitment to a treaty commitment, allowing a bondholder to bring a 
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fully judicable claim under investment arbitration.213 Hence, under 
such clause, sovereign bond restructuring might constitute a wrongful 
international act ipso facto.214 Indeed, a unilateral amendment of the 
terms of the bonds might be considered as a breach by the host state 
insofar as its contractual obligations for repayment of the bonds’ face 
value plus the due interest is concerned.215 Consequently, in keeping 
with the umbrella clause, such a breach could also be considered a 
breach of the respective BIT.216 
In this context, a contentious question has been raised: is any 
contractual breach sufficient to raise a claim under the BIT, or must the 
breach arise from an exercise of the government’s sovereign powers?217 
Under this reasoning, the case of a debt default or restructuring is very 
likely to be considered a sovereign act. 
III 
GREECE’S DEFENSES: THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 
The doctrine of necessity stems from customary international 
investment law.218 It stipulates that a state cannot be held liable for 
actions taken in order to avert a state of emergency.219 As to what 
constitutes a state of emergency, Art. 25 of the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, provides 
that the wrongfulness of action by the state will be precluded if two 
conditions are met.220 Primarily, the state must have acted in order to 
secure an essential interest from a significant and imminent peril; and 
secondly, such actions should not have significantly prejudiced the 
interests of the state or the international community towards which the 
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obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.221 
Importantly, this doctrine cannot be invoked by a state if the state 
contributed to the situation that caused the necessity.222 
The above statutory language was examined by the Tribunal in the 
Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities case,223 wherein the Tribunal 
concluded that the non-payment of public debt may be justifiable in 
extreme economic circumstances.224 The above defense was also used 
by Argentina in cases brought against it for measures taken during the 
financial crisis of 2001.225 Nevertheless, in 2008, when the ICSID 
tribunals issued their decisions on four cases, the awards did not shed 
much light as to how the doctrine of necessity is to be applied in cases 
of extreme financial crises. These awards have been criticized as being 
founded on poor legal reasoning and having several flaws in the sense 
that the tribunals interpreted the BIT in a questionable manner, while 
the awards contradict one another although they refer to similar facts.226 
In fact, three of the four tribunals227 rejected the necessity defense and 
held Argentina fully responsible for its course of action during the 
financial crisis, while the fourth tribunal exonerated Argentina of its 
liability for those acts to a great extent.228 
Greece could argue that the haircut was the only way to avoid 
unregulated insolvency and that the rights of investors and their 
respective states have not been disproportionately affected. Moreover, 
Greece would have to prove the above claim because the party invoking 
the affirmative defense has the burden of proof to evince its elements 
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are met.229 It is, however, questionable whether such assertion would 
be sufficient to preclude liability for the retroactive implementation of 
CACs and the haircut in general. Surely, it must be taken into account 
that the Greek crisis was the immediate aftermath of a global financial 
crisis that was unprecedented in terms of proportion and, therefore, 
unpredictable to a certain extent. However, it should not be forgotten 
that this was also the biggest haircut worldwide, with investors losing 
approximately seventy-five percent of their investment.230 It is further 
worth exploring whether investors may counterclaim that Greece 
contributed to the financial crisis, but such argument would be very 
difficult to prove given that no forum would have the authority to judge 
the merits of such claim that challenge the fiscal policy of a state.231 
IV 
GENERAL REMARKS 
As already mentioned, if GGBs are deemed to fall under the 
protection of BITs, there are various arguments that investors may use 
in order to invoke a breach of the standard of such protection. These 
arguments have also been used in Argentina’s jurisprudence with 
relative success by the investors.232 Greece might be able to escape 
liability from such arguments and claims by invoking the doctrine of 
necessity, the applicability of which in such cases is not yet definite. 
In addition to bringing a claim on the basis of the BIT, bondholders 
have the opportunity to formulate a claim based upon a breach of 
contract referring to the GGBs. This is due to the fact that treaty 
violations go hand-in-hand with contract claims.233 Of course, whether 
there has been a breach under a BIT is a different question than whether 
there has been a breach under the contract, and consequently, it is to be 
examined on the basis of different legal frameworks. Thus, in the case 
of breach of BIT, international law will be of relevance, while national 
law will be considered when establishing the existence of a breach of 
contract.234 In any case, even if an investor’s claim is based on a BIT, 
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the Tribunal may still determine that the claim is essentially 
contractual,235 although, there is not always a clear distinction between 
treaty and contractual claims. 
As evident from the above, although in cases of sovereign default 
investors can incur significant losses, finding reparation can be a 
strenuous and lengthy procedure which may ultimately not lead to the 
desired result due to the inability to enforce an award in an investor’s 
favor. That is why investors are resorting to various mechanisms of 
added protection against such events. One of the most used 
mechanisms is the claim for credit default swaps. Credit default swaps 
(CDS) are briefly examined below. 
V 
REMEDIES FOR RISKS INCURRED 
CDS are insurance contracts aimed to transfer credit risk. They are 
entered into between a buyer and a seller, by virtue of which the seller 
undertakes to protect the buyer from the risk of default of a specific 
entity or asset, in exchange for the payment of a fee or premium by the 
buyer throughout the swap’s duration or until a credit event takes 
place.236 In return, the protection seller will pay the protection buyer an 
agreed amount if a specified credit event occurs during the life of the 
swap.237 In other words, CDS constitutes a form of insurance against 
certain credit events. As per the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association’s (ISDA) Credit Derivative Definitions, a credit event 
occurs in one of seven instances, including, inter alia, debt 
restructuring (individual CDS contracts may provide protection against 
all or some of the seven credit events).238 
Many investors noticing Greece’s worrisome declining course 
purchased CDS in order to minimize their loss or even make a profit. 
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Consequently, these investors may be eligible for compensation in 
keeping with their CDS contractual arrangements. 
Conditions for Compensation 
As explained above, in order for a CDS to become active, one of the 
specifically named credit events must occur. Amongst the 
circumstances that constitute credit events, ISDA has included the 
sovereign debt restructuring, i.e., a sovereign haircut. 
Although, based on the above, one could easily conclude that the 
Greek haircut should have triggered a CDS, the decision for that was 
not an easy one to make. The ISDA expressed a preliminary view in 
which voluntary restructuring does not constitute a credit event.239 
Although the CDS definitions do not make a distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary events, this line of thinking is valid, since 
the meaning of restructuring implies an event that is binding on all 
bondholders, i.e., even those that voted against it.240 On these grounds, 
in October 2011, the ISDA announced that the Greek restructuring was 
not likely to trigger payments under CDS contracts.241 Based on such 
reasoning, CDS would not be used, adding further to investors’ losses 
as they would not only be unable to collect insurance, but they would 
also be obliged to continue to pay the premium for the remaining years 
of the insurance policy. 
The above dilemma was resolved following Greece’s decision to 
retroactively implement CACs on all Greek law-governed GGBs. 
Indeed, in March 2012, the ISDA announced that the introduction of 
CACs by Greece, which unilaterally amended the terms of Greek law 
governed bonds, constituted a restructuring credit event.242 
Receiving compensation is, however, not as easy as it sounds. 
Indeed, many legal issues could arise that may hinder compensation. 
Some of those issues are presented below. 
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Document Risk 
The document risk refers to the industry’s reliance on the 
documentation of CDS Agreements.243 
To illustrate the issues that might be raised, the case of Argentina is 
once again indicative. In November 2001, Argentina announced a 
“one-time offer” for bond exchange.244 According to Argentina, the 
bond swap was voluntary, and as such, did not constitute a credit 
event.245 Rating agencies disagreed with the voluntary nature of the 
bond exchange, given that the prior attitude of the Argentine 
government did not leave much room for restructuring negotiations, 
leaving those who did not accept the exchange at greater risk than those 
who did.246 Despite the rating agencies’ statement, however, ISDA 
considered the agencies’ declaration and a CDS credit event were not 
connected.247 Consequently, many protection sellers refused to pay 
compensation on CDS on the basis that the restructuring was 
voluntary.248 This was not left unanswered by the buyers and many 
cases were brought before the Tribunals. 
A common theme in all the rulings is that the Tribunal first addresses 
the agreement between the parties to see if the issue of a sovereign debt 
restructuring may be considered, under the existing circumstances, 
which is tantamount to coercive obligation exchange.249 However, one 
should not overlook that it is not for the Tribunals to decide upon such 
an issue.250 This would require the Tribunals to foresee whether the 
parties in question will elect to participate in an obligation exchange, 
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and, consequently, to conduct an economic analysis of the obligation 
exchange.251 
One can also understand the difficulties encountered by tribunals 
when interpreting ambiguous terms in a credit derivatives agreement. 
They may provide the protection seller with an opportunity to argue 
that the triggering event did not occur and no payment is due. 
Consequently, the wording of each CDS agreement is extremely 
important in each and every case. 
Short Squeeze Risk 
Another risk that may jeopardize bondholders’ right to 
compensation was demonstrated in the case of the Delphi Corp. 
bankruptcy in 2005.252 In this case, the excellent market position of 
Delphi Corp.’s CDS prior to Delphi Corp.’s petition for bankruptcy did 
not change after such petition, but certain persons, eager to make quick 
money, continued to massively purchase Delphi Corp.’s CDS.253 
Consequently, when parties to these CDSs attempted to buy Delphi 
Corp.’s bonds in order to obtain coverage payment, the bonds’ prices 
had climbed back up.254 It should be stated that in many cases without 
ownership of the reference bonds, protection buyers will be unable to 
make physical deliveries for settlement and hence will not be able to 
receive compensation.255 In the case of Delphi Corp., after months of 
negotiations between CDS holders, an auction was held to determine 
the remuneration the protection buyers were entitled to.256 It was then 
decided to price the bonds “according to the market participants’ open 
positions and not as a result of speculation in the open market”257 and 
that no physical deliveries were required. 
Short squeeze risk is also of relevance in the Greek Haircut case. 
Since Greece entered into the bailout mechanism, the number of CDSs 
purchased increased significantly, partly because of fear of Greece 
defaulting and partly on account of speculators looking for quick 
gains.258 This demonstrates the absence of supervision and regulation 
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in this field, as well as the unregulated and unsettled state of payments 
procedures. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
When it comes to investors’ protection in such cases as sovereign 
debt default and the subsequent sovereign debt restructuring, it is 
obvious that the international community lacks a comprehensive, 
consolidated, and binding legal framework. There is a very large 
number of BITs, each of them—despite their similarities—attempting 
to prevent or solve specific bilateral investment-related issues, aiming 
to protect the investment by the establishment of mandatory standards 
of treatment. That stated, due to the large number and variety of BITs, 
the extent of protection offered may vary significantly from one BIT to 
another. 
All the above is verifiable in the case of Greece’s recent sovereign 
debt crisis. Spending more than it could afford in a period of global 
economic and financial crisis, and consequently growing budgetary 
deficits, Greece accumulated a sky-rocketing public debt.259 Moreover, 
refinancing this debt proved to be extremely difficult due to the almost 
“dry” financial market and significantly higher interest rates.260 To this 
end, Greece resorted to two debt restructurings in 2011 and 2012, 
severely jeopardizing bondholders’ rights. The debt restructurings 
forced bondholders, to a certain extent, to take part in the restructuring, 
due to the unilateral introduction of CACs by the Bondholders Law, 
No.4050/2012, and resulted in significant losses for investors. 
Five years after the bond exchange, bondholders have still been 
unable to obtain reparation, despite having appealed both to the ECtHR 
and the ICSID. In the former, substantive human rights law appeared 
to allow states much discretion to take measures in response to 
economic or social crisis, even when this can affect bondholders’ rights 
who should be aware of the risks. The ICSID, however, did not rule on 
the merits but instead denied jurisdiction on the basis of the BIT’s 
wording of the term investment. Although such a ruling may seem 
discouraging for investors, a large part of the BITs signed by Greece 
contain more favorable wording that could permit a different 
interpretation. 
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If such hindrance is overcome and bonds are deemed to fall under 
the protection of BITs, investors may use various arguments in order 
to invoke a breach of the standard of such protection. These arguments 
have also been used in Argentina’s jurisprudence with relative success 
by investors. Greece might be able to escape liability from such claims 
by invoking the doctrine of necessity, the applicability of which is not 
yet definite in sovereign debt restructuring cases. 
Aware of these significant shortcomings, governments endeavor to 
continue negotiations for reaching an agreement capable of covering 
the most important aspects of FDI, including sovereign debt, sovereign 
default, and sovereign debt restructuring. Unfortunately, the pace of 
such negotiations is still very slow and has not yet adapted to the real 
world’s developmental speed. 
 
